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THE FAILURE OF FANNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC AND THE FUTURE OF 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE 
HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 
Thomas H. Stanton* 
In devising the government’s response to the Great 
Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt turned not only to 
bankers, economists and lawyers, but also to scholars and 
practitioners in the field of public administration such as Charles 
Merriam and Louis Brownlow.1 This article seeks to build on 
that tradition. While other disciplines concern themselves with 
devising appropriate policies, public administration focuses more 
on trying to ensure that those policies are effectively 
implemented.  
Lessons from public administration, and especially the art of 
organizational design, provide insight about the failure of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and also suggest more stable means for 
government to support today’s troubled housing finance system. 
                                                          
 *Thomas H. Stanton is a Fellow of the Center for the Study of American 
Government at Johns Hopkins University. He is a member of the board of 
directors of the National Academy of Public Administration and a former 
member of the federal Senior Executive Service. His publications include two 
books on government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and two edited books on 
federal organization and management. Concerns expressed in A State of Risk: 
Will Government Sponsored Enterprises be the next Financial Crisis? 
(HarperCollins, 1991) helped lead to the enactment of several pieces of 
legislation and the creation of a new GSE regulator, the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Mr. Stanton’s B.A. degree is from 
the University of California at Davis, M.A. from Yale University, and J.D. 
from the Harvard Law School. 
1 See, e.g., PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: 
COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996, at 81–117 (1998).  
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Part I of this Article outlines how the two companies failed 
as a result of high leverage, poor business decisions, and weak 
regulatory supervision. Part II describes inherent vulnerabilities 
of the government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) as an 
organizational form. Specifically, GSE officers and directors 
have a legal obligation to serve shareholders and this can 
conflict with pressure from other stakeholders to serve the public 
purposes for which the GSE is chartered. Often this tension is 
manageable but at key times it is not. The GSE uses its 
government backing to gain so much power as to dominate 
virtually any system of financial accountability that government 
might try to establish. Part III evaluates the GSE as an 
organizational form. While the GSE may possess greater 
capacity and flexibility than a wholly owned government 
corporation or other government agency, it is subject to only 
limited accountability and displays significant vulnerabilities as it 
evolves over its organizational life-cycle.  
Part IV recommends that the two GSEs be placed into 
receivership and converted into wholly owned government 
corporations. The article concludes that the two government 
corporations should either be terminated after five years or, if 
policymakers believe that there is yet further value to be gained 
from them at that time, that they be organized into a single 
government corporation and reauthorized on a five-year cycle to 
periodically determine whether their public benefits still 
outweigh their public costs. Caution is merited here because of 
the systemic implications of concentrating so much financial risk 
into a single specialized financial institution, whether in the 
public or private sector.  
I. WHY FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC FAILED 
On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
voluntarily went into conservatorship.2 As they recognize their 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2008) (prescribing the terms of 
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through the Federal Housing 
Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of 1992); James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed. 
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losses it becomes clear that taxpayer costs from the government 
backing of the two companies will be substantial.3 
The two companies are government-sponsored enterprises, 
privately owned companies that, before their failure, benefitted 
from the perception that the government would back their debt 
obligations and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).4 There are 
                                                          
Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart (Sept. 
7, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/economy/lockhart_ 
statement/index.htm (“In order to restore balance between safety and 
soundness and mission, FHFA has placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship.”); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y, Treasury Department, 
Statement on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to 
Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm (“I support the Director’s 
decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him that 
conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer dollars 
to the GSEs.”). The law prescribes that the regulator should use 
conservatorship to restore the companies to financial health. See, e.g., FED. 
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON 
CONSERVATORSHIP 2 (2008) (“A conservatorship is the legal process in 
which a person or entity is appointed to establish control and oversight over a 
Company to put it in a sound and solvent condition. In a conservatorship, the 
powers of the Company’s directors, officers, and shareholders are transferred 
to the designated Conservator.”).  
3 See Dawn Kopecki, Fannie, Freddie Won’t Repay All Aid, Lockhart 
Says, BLOOMBERG, July 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601103&sid=aEwoLtQMHq5Y (“Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, the largest U.S. mortgage-finance companies, won’t be able to repay all 
of the $84.9 billion in federal aid they have received since being seized by 
the government last year, their regulator said.”). 
4 More formally, a government-sponsored enterprise is a government 
chartered, privately owned and privately controlled institution that, while 
lacking an express government guarantee, benefits from the perception that 
the government stands behind its financial obligations. See Ronald C. Moe & 
Thomas H. Stanton, Government Sponsored Enterprises as Federal 
Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public 
Accountability, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 321, 321–22 (1989); accord 2 U.S.C. 
§ 622(8) (2009) (definition Congress enacted in amendments to the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974). The Treasury purchase of stock in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008, and its commitment to 
infuse up to $200 billion into the companies as needed, made the 
government’s backing explicit rather than implicit, as it had been before the 
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five GSEs: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System, the Farm Credit System and a small GSE known 
as Farmer Mac.5 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac 
are investor-owned. The Farm Credit System and Federal Home 
Loan Bank System are cooperatives, owned by their member-
borrowers.6 A sixth GSE, Sallie Mae, which funds student 
loans, gave up its government sponsorship and became a 
completely private investor-owned company.7  
The housing bubble was an unprecedented increase in 
housing prices averaging over 100 percent from 2000–2006 in 
urban areas, followed by a substantial drop in prices.8 The 
failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cannot be attributed 
solely to the housing credit bubble and collapse. Rather, it 
appears that the collapse of the housing credit bubble was a 
precipitating event with consequences that could have been 
avoided by more prudent practices by the two GSEs and their 
management, and that revealed shortcomings in the GSE as an 
institutional form.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac committed serious 
misjudgments that helped to bring about their insolvency. The 
most serious misjudgments involved the companies’ resistance to 
accepting more effective supervision and capital standards.9 For 
                                                          
companies went into government hands.  
5 THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: 
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD 1 (2002) [hereinafter 
STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES]. 
6 Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Reality 
Catches up to Public Administration Theory, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV 632, 632 
(2009) [hereinafter Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory].  
7 Thomas H. Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement in a Market: 
Lessons from the Privatization of Sallie Mae, 28 PUB. BUDGETING. & FIN. 
101–23 (2008) [hereinafter Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement].  
8 See, e.g., MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: A 360º LOOK AT THE 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2009). 
9 Among the bills that the GSEs helped to defeat in the years 2000–2007 
were Fed. Hous. Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act, S. 1100, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (enacted); Fed. Hous. Fin. Reform Act, H.R. 1427, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (enacted); Fed. Hous. Fin. Reform Act, 109th Cong. (2005) 
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years, starting with their successful efforts to weaken the 
legislation that established their regulator, the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),10 the two companies 
managed to fend off capital standards that would have reduced 
their excessive leverage and provided a cushion to absorb 
potential losses.11 In 2007 Freddie Mac concluded a stock 
buyback program that further weakened the company’s ability to 
withstand a financial shock.12 As late as March 2008, Freddie 
                                                          
(enacted); Fed. Hous. Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act, S. 190, 109th 
Cong. (2005); Fed. Hous. Enterprise Oversight Modernization Act, S. 1656, 
108th Cong. (2003); Leave No Securities Behind Act, H.R. 2022, 108th 
Cong. (2003); Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprises Regulatory 
Improvement Act, H.R. 2575, 108th Cong. (2003); Hous. Fin. Regulatory 
Restructuring Act, H.R. 2803, 107th Cong. (2002); Secondary Mortgage 
Market Enterprises Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 1409, 107th Cong. 
(2001); Hous. Fin. Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 3703, 106th Cong. 
(2000).  
10 Many reports document the successful efforts of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac at weakening the legislation creating OFHEO and prescribing 
their capital standards. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, Privileged Position: 
Fannie Mae Expected to Escape Attempt at Tighter Regulation, WALL ST. J., 
June 19, 1992, at A1; Stephen Labaton, Power of the Mortgage Twins: 
Fannie and Freddie Guard Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12 1991, at D1; 
Carol Matlack, Getting Their Way, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 27, 1990, at 2584–88; 
Jill Zuckman, Bills to Increase GSE Oversight Move Ahead in House, Senate, 
CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 3, 1991, http://www.cq.com/display.do?dockey=/ 
cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/weeklyreport/102/wr404032.html@allnewsarchi
ve&metapub=CQ-WEEKLYREPORT&searchIndex=5&seqNum=6.   
11 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Address at the UC Berkley/UCLA Symposium: The Future of 
Mortgage Finance in the U.S. (Oct. 31, 2008) (“For example, the GSEs were 
reluctant earlier this year to raise capital and to expand their operations, even 
though this would have helped financial and macroeconomic stability at a 
time of much-reduced mortgage availability. The GSEs’ disinclination to 
support the mortgage market was motivated by the fact that raising additional 
capital would have diluted the values of the holding of the existing private 
shareholders.”).  
12 FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN. REP. at 25 (“On March 23, 2007, we 
announced that our board of directors had authorized us to repurchase up to 
$1 billion of outstanding shares of common stock. The repurchase program 
was completed in August 2007.”).  
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Mac defied calls to increase its capital cushion.13 As late as 
summer 2008, Fannie Mae continued to resist legislation that 
would give a federal regulator the discretion to set higher capital 
standards.14 As a result the two companies were far too weak 
financially to cope with any significant financial stress that might 
occur.  
The companies fought for high leverage because it benefited 
their shareholders and managers, at least until the companies 
failed.15 Freddie Mac reported returns on equity of over 20 
percent in most years since becoming an investor-owned 
company in 1989, reaching highs of 47.2 percent in 2002 and 
39.0 percent in 2000.16 Fannie Mae reported earnings of almost 
as much, reaching a high of 39.8 percent in 2001.17 The two 
companies fought higher capital requirements because more 
capital would have diluted those returns to shareholders.18  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac compounded the problem of 
their self-inflicted structural vulnerabilities with a series of 
misjudgments that involved taking on excessive risk just at the 
point that housing prices were peaking.19 According to press 
reports, the chief executives of both Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac disregarded warnings from their risk officers and greatly 
increased their purchases of risky loans to catch up with the 
                                                          
13 David S. Hilzenrath, Chief Says Freddie Won’t Raise Capital: 
Mortgage Financer Cites Responsibility to Shareholders, Won’t Increase Loan 
Capacity, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2008, at D04.  
14 Steven Sloan, Fannie CEO Details Issues with GSE Bill, AM. BANKER, 
June 5, 2008, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/173_109/-354497-
1.html. 
15 Bernanke, supra note 11. 
16 FED. HOUS. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 110, 127 (2008) (Freddie 
Mac).  
17 Id. at 127. 
18 See supra notes 9–11.  
19 See James B. Lockhart, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA’S First 
Anniversary and Challenges Ahead (July 30, 2009) (transcript available in the 
National Press Club) (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not create the 
housing price bubble, but their procyclical actions further inflated the bubble, 
despite our regulatory efforts to curtail their growth.”). 
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market.20 The following excerpts from their annual reports 
indicate that the two GSEs took on substantial risk from 
purchasing subprime mortgages (i.e., those with borrowers who 
failed to meet traditional standards of creditworthiness), “Alt-A” 
mortgages (i.e., “Alternative-A” mortgages which lacked 
verification of crucial data about creditworthiness such as the 
borrower’s income), “interest-only” mortgages (those that 
permitted borrowers to continue to accrue mortgage principal 
without paying it down in a timely fashion), and adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs) (those that allowed mortgage interest rates 
and borrowers’ required monthly payments to increase over time 
according to a stated index even though the borrower might have 
qualified only to make monthly payments on the mortgage at a 
lower interest rate).21 Freddie Mac reported in its 2007 Annual 
Report that: 
[t]he proportion of higher risk mortgage loans that were 
originated in the market during the last four years 
increased significantly. We have increased our 
securitization volume of non-traditional mortgage 
products, such as interest-only loans and loans originated 
with less documentation in the last two years in response 
to the prevalence of these products within the origination 
market. Total non-traditional mortgage products, 
including those designated as Alt-A and interest-only 
loans, made up approximately 30% and 24% of our 
single-family mortgage purchase volume in the years 
                                                          
20 See., e.g., Charles Duhigg, The Reckoning: Pressured to Take More 
Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/business/05fannie.html; Charles 
Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Discarded Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/business/05freddie.html; David 
S. Hilzenrath, Fannie’s Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans: As It Tried to 
Increase Its Business, Company Gave Risks Short Shrift, Documents Show, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2008, at D01.  
21 Among the most financially risky ARMs were those with initial low 
rates (so-called “teaser rates”) that reset to much higher rates after two or 
three years.  
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ended December 31, 2007 and 2006, respectively.22  
Fannie Mae’s 2007 Annual Report states: 
[w]e are experiencing high serious delinquency rates and 
credit losses across our conventional single-family 
mortgage credit book of business, especially for loans to 
borrowers with low credit scores and loans with high 
loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios. In addition, in 2007 we 
experienced particularly rapid increases in serious 
delinquency rates and credit losses in some higher risk 
loan categories, such as Alt-A loans, adjustable-rate 
loans, interest-only loans, negative amortization loans, 
loans made for the purchase of condominiums and loans 
with second liens. Many of these higher risk loans were 
originated in 2006 and the first half of 2007.23 
Fannie Mae reported that purchases of interest-only and 
negative amortizing ARMs amounted to 7% of its business 
volume in 2007 and 12% in both 2006 and 2005.24 Moreover, 
Alt-A mortgage loans “represented approximately 16% 
of . . . single-family business volume in 2007, compared with 
approximately 22% and 16% in 2006 and 2005, respectively.”25 
Both companies also invested in highly rated private-label, 
mortgage-related securities, backed by Alt-A or subprime 
mortgage loans, amounting to total holdings by the two 
companies of over $200 billion in 2007.26  
In short, the mix of private incentives and government 
backing created a dynamic leading not only to the hubris that 
brought about the meltdown of internal controls at both Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac a few years ago,27 but also to their 
                                                          
22 FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN. REP., at 13. 
23 FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP., at 24. 
24 Id. at 128. 
25 Id. at 129.  
26 FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP. 93 (2008); FREDDIE MAC, 2007 ANN. 
REP. 94 (2008). 
27 Thomas H. Stanton, The Life Cycle of the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise: Lessons for Design and Accountability, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
837, 840 [hereinafter Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability] (2007).  
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insolvency in 2008. 
That said, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not cause the 
housing bubble or the proliferation of subprime and other 
mortgages that borrowers could not afford to repay. In analyzing 
the dynamics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, I discovered a 
phenomenon that can be called Stanton’s Law: risk will migrate 
to the place where government is least equipped to deal with it.28 
Thus, the capital markets arbitraged across regulatory 
requirements and sent literally trillions of dollars of mortgages 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,29 where capital requirements 
were low and federal supervision was weak.30 
However, the capital markets also found other places where 
government could not manage the risk,31 including structured 
investment vehicles of commercial banks, private securitization 
conduits, and collateralized debt obligations that were virtually 
unregulated except by the vagaries of the rating agencies and 
exuberance of the market during the housing bubble.32 Huge 
                                                          
28 I first presented this dynamic in 1989 testimony before the Senate 
Banking Committee, where I pointed out that increases in stringency of 
capital requirements and government supervision for thrift institutions after 
the savings and loan debacle would drive many billions of dollars of 
mortgages from the portfolios of savings and loan associations to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac because their capital standards and government oversight 
were much weaker. The Safety and Soundness of Government Sponsored 
Enterprises: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 101st Cong. 41, 52 (1989) (statement of Thomas H. Stanton, 
Attorney at Law).  
29 See, e.g., Report to Congress 2008, supra note 16, at 111 tbl.4 
(Fannie Mae), 128 tbl.11 (Freddie Mac) for the annual growth of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.  
30 See supra notes 9–11. 
31 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition: Lessons of the Financial Crisis for 
Banking Supervision (May 7, 2009). 
32 See, e.g., Markus Brunnermeier et al., The Fundamental Principles of 
Financial Regulation, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11, 
Preliminary Conference Draft, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR), Jan. 2009, app. A “The Boundary Problem in Financial 
Regulation,” at 63–69.  
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volumes of subprime, Alt-A, interest-only and other “toxic 
mortgages” went to these parts of the market.33 As the bubble 
reached its limits and began to deflate, the GSEs tried to catch 
up and regain the market share that they had lost to the new 
competition. Former Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron explained 
the pressures on the GSEs:  
The subprime market was developed largely by private 
label participants, as were most non-traditional mortgage 
products. Freddie Mac entered the non-traditional slice of 
the market because, as the private lending sector shifted 
toward those types of loans, Freddie needed to participate 
in order to carry out its public mission of promoting 
affordability, liquidity and stability in housing finance. In 
addition, if it had not done so, it could not have 
remained competitive or even relevant in the residential 
mortgage market we were designed to serve.34  
II. LESSONS FROM THE FAILURE OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE 
MAC 
Many other kinds of financial institutions have failed in the 
current debacle, including commercial banks, thrift institutions, 
mortgage companies, and insurance companies. Among all of 
these, the GSE has specific shortcomings that call the value of 
this institutional form into doubt.  
In making their mistakes, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
revealed the inherent vulnerabilities of the GSE as an 
organizational model. First, the GSE lives or dies according to 
its charter and other laws that determine the conditions under 
which it operates.35 That means that GSEs must balance their 
                                                          
33 Id.  
34 The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th 
Cong. 17–22 (2008) [hereinafter Syron Statement] (statement of Richard F. 
Syron, Former CEO of Freddie Mac), available at http://oversight.house. 
gov/story.asp?ID=2252. 
35 See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, 2007 ANN. REP., at 29–31 (“As a federally 
chartered corporation, we are subject to the limitations imposed by the 
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profit goals against public purposes and those interests of 
stakeholders which can influence their charters.  
Second, the GSE combines private ownership with 
government backing in a way that creates a political force that 
can dominate virtually any safety-and-soundness framework. 
GSEs select chief officers, in good part, based on their ability to 
manage political risk,36 rather than on their ability to manage 
two of the largest financial institutions in the world. This article 
will consider these issues in turn. 
A. GSEs Are Inherently Difficult if Not Impossible to Manage 
The GSE business model, involving private ownership and 
public purposes, is difficult, if not impossible, to manage. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were more vulnerable than 
commercial banks or other federal instrumentalities to the 
contradictions between the requirement to serve private 
shareholders and the need to serve public purposes that other 
stakeholders, including members of Congress, guarded and 
                                                          
Charter Act, extensive regulation, supervision and examination by OFHEO 
and HUD, and regulation by other federal agencies, including the Department 
of the Treasury and the SEC. We are also subject to many laws and 
regulations that affect our business, including those regarding taxation and 
privacy. In addition, the policy, approach or regulatory philosophy of these 
agencies can materially affect our business.”).  
36 For example, in the mid-1990s the Congressional Budget Office 
reported on some of Fannie Mae’s activities: 
In keeping with its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and its 
own financial interests, the management of the housing GSEs has 
devoted a significant (but undisclosed) portion of the enterprises’ 
resources to countering—or hedging—that political risk . . . . Fannie 
Mae, in particular, makes no secret of its attempts to influence 
federal policy toward the GSEs as a means of controlling political 
risk . . . . Significantly, too, Fannie Mae explicitly includes the 
contribution to preserving its ‘franchise’ when evaluating the 
performance of executive staff. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 36–37 (1996) (internal citations omitted). 
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enforced.37  
It has long been recognized that GSEs are a special type of 
federal instrumentality.38 Other federal instrumentalities include 
most commercial banks and thrift institutions and other for-profit 
and nonprofit institutions chartered to serve public purposes.39 In 
contrast to those other instrumentalities, the officers and 
directors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seem to have had a 
much more difficult time balancing their fiduciary 
responsibilities to shareholders against the public purposes of 
their charter acts.40 Pressure from stakeholders to carry out 
public purposes,41 too, has conflicted with the GSEs’ 
responsibility to maintain themselves as sources of long-term 
                                                          
37 Richard Syron, Freddie Mac’s former CEO, pointed to this issue: 
Freddie Mac is a shareholder-owned corporation, chartered for the 
public purpose of supporting America’s mortgage finance markets, 
and operating under government mandates. We had obligations to 
Congress and to the public to promote our chartered purposes of 
increasing affordability, liquidity and stability in housing finance, 
which included some very specific low-income housing goals. 
Syron Statement, supra note 34. 
38 STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 13–32 ch.2.  
39 See, e.g., THOMAS H. STANTON, A STATE OF RISK: WILL 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES BE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS? 
App. A, at 205–07 (1991) [hereinafter STANTON, A STATE OF RISK]; Thomas 
H. Stanton, Federal Supervision of Safety and Soundness of Government-
Sponsored Enterprises, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 395 (1991) [hereinafter Stanton, 
Federal Supervision]. 
40 Richard Syron, Freddie Mac’s former CEO, faced this problem: 
Freddie Mac chief executive Richard F. Syron . . . said yesterday 
that conflicting demands on the government-chartered mortgage giant 
have made his job “almost impossible.” 
On the eve of Freddie Mac’s quarterly earnings report, Syron said 
that the McLean company has been whipsawed by the dual tasks of 
creating profit for private investors and serving the public by 
boosting the housing market. “What this organization is all about is 
balancing among the different missions,” Syron said in an interview. 
“It makes the job almost impossible.” 
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & David S. Hilzenrath, Freddie CEO Feels Strain of 
Firm’s Twin Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at D01. 
41 See, e.g., Syron Statement, supra note 34. 
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strength to the housing market.42 
Perhaps most eloquent on this issue was Daniel Mudd, the 
former CEO of Fannie Mae, who testified in December 2008: 
I would advocate moving the GSEs out of No Man’s 
Land. Events have shown how difficult it is to balance 
financial, capital, market, housing, shareholder, 
bondholder, homeowner, private, and public interests in 
a crisis of these proportions. We should examine whether 
the economy and the markets are better served by fully 
private or fully public GSEs.43 
There were several reasons why Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were susceptible to being whipsawed between their 
fiduciary obligations to shareholders and their public purposes. 
One source of mischief was the fact that the two companies 
were chartered by an act of Congress rather than by an 
independent federal administrative agency. Members of 
Congress could constantly pressure Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to undertake unwise lending policies. The two GSEs 
complied as a way to buy loyalty from the relevant 
congressional committees that otherwise might accede to 
requests from the Treasury or others to impose higher capital 
requirements or other restrictions that were unwelcome to 
shareholders. For example, Mr. Mudd testified that he felt 
pressure to increase Fannie Mae’s market activity even as other 
                                                          
42 [W]e have to confront the future of the secondary mortgage 
market, which will, I believe, shape the other decisions. That has to 
be the first principle as we . . . evaluate the options for Fannie 
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s future. A second principle is that the 
Enterprises or any successors should have a well-defined and 
internally consistent mission based on their fundamental role in the 
mortgage market. Their mission activities should not require 
excessive risk taking as it did in the past. 
Lockhart, supra note 19. 
43 The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th 
Cong. 25–26 (2008) (written statement of Daniel H. Mudd, Former Interim 
CEO of Fannie Mae), available at http://oversight.house.gov/story. 
asp?ID=2252. 
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institutions were stepping back because of declining market 
conditions.44 Stakeholder pressure to serve public purposes was 
substantial; by contrast, far fewer stakeholders pushed to ensure 
effective supervision of safety and soundness.45 
In addition, the GSEs selected a political strategy of 
achieving short-term goals at the potential cost of longer term 
achievements. Their refusal to accept bank-type capital 
requirements and a bank-type supervisory framework for 
accountability has already been mentioned.46 The GSEs 
marshaled so much political power that they simply dominated 
their environment and dampened feedback signals that might 
have helped company officials to make better decisions.47 In 
return, however, the GSEs had to buy off stakeholders with 
large volumes of mortgage purchases that they, or at least their 
risk officers, knew were unwise.48 
In their governance shortcomings, the two GSEs 
compounded the more general problem that the current debacle 
has revealed. Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan 
Greenspan, put it best:  
I made a mistake in presuming that the self interest of 
organizations, specifically banks and others, was such 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT: 
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 
107, Cambridge University Press (2003).  
46 See sources cited supra notes 9–17. 
47 This problem is analyzed with respect to the two GSEs’ failed internal 
controls in Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 27.  
48 See sources cited supra note 20. Confidential company documents 
released by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on 
December 9, 2008 detail some of the pressures on the companies and the 
mistakes made by the GSEs during 2005 through 2007. In particular, these 
documents indicate that the GSEs sought yield and market share despite 
added risk from nontraditional mortgage products and warnings from risk 
officers. Fannie Mae Office of Corporate Strategy, Memorandum to Daniel 
Mudd . . . from Gary Friend, Subject: CONFIDENTIAL Cambridge 
Summary, July 7, 2006, available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/ 
20081209131806.pdf (“Single Family’s strategy is to say ‘yes’ to our 
customers by increasing purchases of sub-prime and Alt-A loans . . . .”).  
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that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders and the equity in the firms.49  
There are significant governance implications of this 
admission, coming as it does from a firm believer in the 
efficiency of market forces.50 Not only GSEs, but other financial 
firms also sought ways to increase their leverage and reduce the 
quality of their government supervision.51 There was a 
difference, though. As they served the perceived interests of 
their shareholders, banks and other investors were filled with the 
irrational exuberance of the market bubble. In addition, the 
GSEs faced (and failed to manage) stakeholder pressure to 
engage in activities that they probably knew (as their risk 
officers did), could inflict serious harm on the companies.52  
B. GSEs Gain Virtually Unstoppable Political Power 
The GSE combines private ownership with government 
backing in a way that creates a political force that can dominate 
virtually any safety-and-soundness framework. The statutory 
framework of GSEs also creates special financial vulnerability 
because of incentives that GSEs have to appoint CEOs and 
senior management that are politically adept and who may not 
necessarily be experienced at managing a major financial 
                                                          
49 Kevin G. Hall, Greenspan Takes Some Blame for Financial Meltdown, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www. 
mcclatchydc.com/staff/kevin_hall/v-print/story/54712.html. 
50 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bd., Speech to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure: 
Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005) (“Except where market 
discipline is undermined by moral hazard, for example, because of federal 
guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally has proved far better 
at constraining excessive risk-taking than has government regulation.”).  
51 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, The Reckoning: Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let 
Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008 (reporting an SEC rule 
change which allowed investment banks to increase leverage significantly, 
enacted at behest of the regulated firms).  
52 See sources cited supra note 20. 
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institution.53 
A GSE lives or dies according to the terms of its enabling 
legislation.54 Especially GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac that are directly chartered by Congress have tended (albeit 
not invariably) to select CEOs because of their ability to manage 
political risk rather than the risks that derive from their financial 
activities.55 This was seen in the newest GSE, Farmer Mac, 
which returned to Congress several times since its original 
authorization in 1987 requesting adjustments to its charter 
powers so that it could offer increasingly profitable financial 
services. Farmer Mac has never been a strong success in public 
policy terms56 and has invested heavily in assets that have 
nothing to do with meeting public needs.57  
                                                          
53 KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 101 (“ . . . Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
rosters boast numerous alumni of the executive and legislative branches . . . 
Furthermore, there is an impressive history of GSE executives crossing back 
into government service, giving the company advantages in terms of access, 
and sympathy, at the highest levels.”). 
54 STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 70–75 (“From 
mercantilist times, companies with special charter privileges have understood 
that their ultimate success or failure hinges even more on politics than on the 
efficient provision of services.”). 
55 KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 99 (“[S]ince every aspect of their 
operations can be affected by congressional action, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac have powerful incentives to devote significant attention to Congress and 
politics in general. Thus one can conclude that GSEs will possess resources 
and motive to expend these resources for political advantage.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
56 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REP. TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON CAPITAL MARKETS, SEC. AND GOV’T-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
FARMER MAC: REVISED CHARTER ENHANCES SECONDARY MARKET 
ACTIVITY, BUT GROWTH DEPENDS ON VARIOUS FACTORS, GAO/GGD-99-85 
(May 1999). 
57 Among other investments having nothing to do with its public purpose, 
in September 2008 Farmer Mac held in its investment portfolio $50.0 million 
of Fannie Mae floating rate preferred stock and $60.0 million of Lehman 
Brothers senior debt securities. After taking losses on these investments the 
GSE was recapitalized on September 30, 2008 by issuing new stock to 
institutions of the Farm Credit System, another GSE, and thereby averted 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made a practice of mastering 
political risk, both by providing blandishments to favored 
members of the political establishment and other stakeholders, 
and by aggressively containing threats to what the companies 
considered their franchise value.58 The GSEs are active 
participants in the process of influencing policymakers, 
especially those who are in positions to affect their charter 
legislation.59 On April 19, 2006, Freddie Mac paid a record fine 
to the Federal Election Commission to settle charges that the 
company violated federal law by using company resources to 
hold some $1.7 million in fundraisers, many involving the then-
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.60 That 
Committee is responsible for the legislation that created both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and periodically considered 
legislation to address shortcomings in their supervision.61 
                                                          
insolvency. See Farmer Mac, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 10, 
2008).  
58 This has been a long-standing policy. In 1991 Representative Jim 
Leach (R-IA) stated: 
[I]t is not surprising that Fannie and Freddie are beginning to exhibit 
that arrogant characteristic of a duopoly, controlling 90% of the 
market. Such market dominance allows for heavy-handed approaches 
to competitors, to financial intermediaries, and to consumers. 
Competitors such as community based savings and loan associations 
and commercial banks are also users of GSE services. They are 
understandably apprehensive about expressing reservations about 
their practices in fear of retaliation. Likewise, would-be competitors 
such as securities firms run well known market risks if they object 
or attempt to compete with Fannie and Freddie. The two GSEs 
distribute billions of dollars of business on Wall Street and have a 
reputation of not cottoning to challengers of the status quo. 
H.COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, H.R. Rep. No. 102-
206, at 122 (1991) (Dissenting Views of Representative Jim Leach from 
Report to accompany H.R. 2900 on the Government-Sponsored Housing 
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1991). 
59 KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 99. 
60 See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 
27. 
61 Id. Almost all of the legislation cited supra in note 9, falls within the 
jurisdiction of the House Financial Services Committee. 
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Professor Jonathan Koppell notes that “the characteristics 
that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from 
traditional government agencies and private companies endow 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources.”62 
The potential inability of government to supervise safety and 
soundness of the GSEs has long been recognized. The Treasury 
pointed this out in a 1991 study of GSEs:  
The problem of avoiding capture appears to be 
particularly acute in the case of regulation of GSEs. The 
principal GSEs are few in number; they have highly 
qualified staffs; they have strong support for their 
programs from special interest groups; and they have 
significant resources with which to influence political 
outcomes. A weak financial regulator would find GSE 
political power overwhelming and even the most 
powerful and respected government agencies would find 
regulating such entities a challenge.63 
The Treasury knew whereof it spoke. There are at least two 
cases on record where the Treasury Department, which had no 
safety-and-soundness regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, reportedly came under pressure and agreed to 
make its reported views more congenial to the two companies.64 
                                                          
62 KOPPELL, supra note 45, at 97. 
63 TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 1991 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE 
TREASURY ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 8 (1991). 
64 On the weakening of a 1996 Treasury report on desirability and 
feasibility of removing government sponsorship from Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, see, for example, Jackie Calmes, Federal Mortgage Firm Is 
Facing New Assault to Privileged Status: But Fannie Has Clout to Counter 
the Agencies That Seek to Privatize It, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1986, at 1; 
Chairman Richard Baker, comments, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Securities, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Oversight of the 
Federal National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae] and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation [Freddie Mac], 104th Congress, 2nd session 
136–41 (July 24, 1996). For discussion of possible pressure in 1991 on 
Treasury to state that HUD would be an appropriate regulator of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, see Thomas H. Stanton, Increasing the Accountability of 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Next Steps, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572 
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Thanks to the lobbying power of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, OFHEO was, at its creation, an institution that lacked the 
capacity to do its job.65 OFHEO was limited by the 
appropriations process and had a budget that was much smaller, 
in comparison to its responsibilities, than the budgets of federal 
bank regulators.66  
Whenever OFHEO tried to do its job well, as in the 2004 
Special Examination Report on Fannie Mae, it experienced 
political pressure.67 Fannie Mae lobbyists generated a 
congressional request for the Inspector General (IG) of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
investigate OFHEO’s conduct of the special examination.68 
Between October 2002 and June 2004, there were three other 
congressional requests for IG investigations of OFHEO.69 Fannie 
Mae lobbyists also tried to use the appropriations process to 
force a change in the leadership of OFHEO. They convinced the 
relevant Senate Appropriations Subcommittee to try to withhold 
$10 million from OFHEO’s appropriation until a new OFHEO 
director was appointed.70 
The enactment of a stronger supervisory framework in 2008 
meant that the new regulator, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), was no longer subject to the appropriations 
process.71 However, the political strength of the GSEs was 
reflected in the fact that the new legislation, improving as it did 
                                                          
(1991), and articles cited therein. 
65 STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 42.  
66 See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 
27. 
67 OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF 
THE SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF FANNIE MAE 273–77 (May 2006), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/747/FNMSPECIALEXAM.pdf.  
68 Id. at 273. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 284. 
71 Section 1106 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA), Pub. L. 110-289, amended the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises 
Safety and Soundness Act to remove the new regulator from the 
appropriations process. 
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on the old law, continued to deny the regulator the mandate, 
discretion, or authority to regulate safety and soundness that 
federal bank regulators have long possessed.72  
The new Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(“HERA”) became law less than two months before Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac failed.73 Ultimately the two GSEs were not 
well-served by their tradition of selecting politically capable 
CEOs who could fend off the kind of supervision that a more 
capable regulator might have been able to provide.74  
Because of their government backing and low capital 
requirements in their charters, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
gained immense market power.75 They doubled in size every five 
years or so76 until their failure in 2008, when the two companies 
had funded over $5 trillion of mortgages—over 40 percent of the 
mortgage market.77 
Their market power gave them political power. Whenever 
someone would urge regulatory reform, such as higher capital 
standards to reduce the GSEs’ dangerous leverage, huge 
numbers of constituents could be expected to flood Capitol 
Hill.78 In turn, that political power further entrenched the GSEs’ 
                                                          
72 To give but one example, the new law required the new regulator to 
conduct an estimated 25–30 rulemakings, often with short deadlines, to 
implement key provisions of the act. The bank regulators have discretion in 
many of the areas where HERA sought to impose inflexibility upon the 
FHFA through required rulemakings. 
73 President Bush signed HERA into law on July 30, 2008; Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac went into conservatorship on September 7, 2008.  
74 See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 
27, at 844 (“What does effective accountability mean? First, feedback is 
essential for effective operations . . . . Many examples exist, in both the 
private and public sectors, of how too much autonomy can lead to subsequent 
failure.”). 
75 STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 70–75. 
76 See, e.g., figures presented in STANTON, supra note 5, at 4.  
77 See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, A History of Public Aid During Crises, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at A27.  
78 Observers have long noted this pattern. David A. Vise, The Money 
Machine: How Fannie Mae Wields Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1995, at 
A14 (“Builders, real estate brokers and bankers across the country rely so 
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market power.  
The failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shows the 
shortcomings of the GSE as an organizational model. However 
sound the accountability structure may be when the organization 
begins, the incentive to satisfy private owners will lead a GSE to 
try to weaken safety and soundness oversight and reduce capital 
standards. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac arguably had 
more effective accountability structures when they were 
chartered as GSEs than when they were supervised by OFHEO. 
Between 1968 and 1992, when OFHEO was established, both 
companies had successfully removed government controls that 
they considered unacceptable.79 
In short, the drive to satisfy shareholders is intense and can 
easily overwhelm considerations for the financial system, the 
housing system, and American taxpayers. 
III. EVALUATING THE GSE AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
A. Four Criteria Help to Evaluate Organizations That Carry 
Out Public Purposes: Capacity, Flexibility, 
Accountability, and Life-Cycle 
Four criteria are helpful in evaluating the quality of 
government agencies and instrumentalities that carry out public 
purposes:80  
                                                          
heavily on Fannie Mae for mortgage funds that they live in fear of offending 
the firm and routinely defend it in Washington.”). 
79 For example, when Freddie Mac was chartered as a GSE in 1970 its 
board of directors consisted of three federal officials rather than a 
shareholder-controlled board; when Fannie Mae was chartered in 1968 its 
charter contained provisions permitting the HUD Secretary to fix the 
capitalization of the GSE at 6.6 percent, significantly higher than the 2.5 
percent permitted by the 1992 Act. 
80 See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable 
Government: A Guide to Organizational Design, in MEETING THE 
CHALLENGE OF 9/11: BLUEPRINTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 25 
(2006) [hereinafter Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government]; 
Thomas H. Stanton, The Administration of Medicare, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1373 (2003) [hereinafter Stanton, Administration of Medicare]. 
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Capacity: What is the capacity of the organization, in 
terms of people, administrative budget, systems, and 
organization, to carry out its public purposes? 
Flexibility: What flexibility does the organization have, 
under the law and in practice, to carry out its public 
purposes? 
Accountability: How well is the organization held 
accountable for (1) carrying out its public purposes, and 
(2) its stewardship of public resources? 
Life Cycle: As the organization matures, what strengths 
and shortcomings manifest themselves? 
For different organizations, different measures will become 
more critical than others in understanding strengths and 
weaknesses. As a general rule, to the extent that weaknesses 
appear, government agencies may have difficulty with the 
measures of capacity and flexibility, while privately owned 
instrumentalities may have difficulty with accountability.81 
Numerous organizations of all types have difficulty with life-
cycle, and the ability to remain active, focused, and useful over 
many years.82  
Government-sponsored enterprises are privately owned 
institutions free from the budgetary and other constraints 
imposed on government agencies.83 As such, they tend to 
develop significant capacity and flexibility compared to 
government agencies that serve the same economic sector.84 A 
comparison of mortgage operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, on the one hand, and the Federal Housing Administration 
                                                          
81 Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra note 80, at 
25; Stanton, Administration of Medicare, supra note 80. 
82 Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra note 80, at 
25; Stanton, Administration of Medicare, supra note 80. 
83 Thomas H. Stanton & Ronald C. Moe, Government Corporations and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, in TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 85 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter 
Stanton & Moe] (“Indeed, GSEs can, and usually do, become virtually 
autonomous from the government that charters them.”).  
84 Stanton, Reducing Government Involvement, supra note 7. 
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(FHA), on the other, displays this pattern. While Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were able to dedicate substantial resources to 
building their automated underwriting and other mortgage-
related systems, the federal budget process has constrained FHA 
from making similar needed investments even though they are 
essential to the future success of the agency.85 
On the other hand, the issue of accountability is salient for 
GSEs, and for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in particular. As 
private companies operating with substantial government 
subsidies, GSEs often grow to dominate their markets.86 Market 
power leads to political power,87 which in turn leads to favorable 
changes to the GSE’s charter that help expand its market power 
and reduce the effectiveness of any accountability framework 
government may seek to apply to the GSEs.  
Finally, the issue of life cycle is also important for the 
GSEs. The rapid growth of GSEs combined with their ability to 
dominate their government regulator and other accountability 
measures and avoid being required to adopt prudent capital 
standards can lead to flawed business decisions.88 The current 
crisis in the mortgage market highlights problems of GSE 
accountability and life cycle with special force.  
B. GSE Vulnerabilities Will Not Disappear Merely by 
Changing Regulation or Governance  
Proposals to craft special rules such as regulating the GSEs 
as public utilities89 or limiting them to cooperative ownership90  
                                                          
85 Steve Preston, Secretary, HUD, Prepared Remarks at the National 
Press Club (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/speeches/ 
2008-11-19.cfm. 
86 STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 3 (“Thanks to 
their special government benefits, GSEs have grown rapidly to dominate 
many market segments, especially in housing (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the Federal Home Loan Banks) and student loans (Sallie Mae).”). 
87 See supra note 78.  
88 See, e.g., Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 
27.  
89 See, e.g., Steven Sloan & Emily Flitter, Paulson’s Third Way: GSEs 
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will not overcome the vulnerabilities of the GSE as an 
institutional form that is based on political dominance. Such 
proposals to create a different accountability framework or 
governance structure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not 
change the assessment of the GSE’s organizational form. Most 
importantly, the issue of political dominance of the GSEs over 
their regulators, and GSE influence over their congressional 
authorizing committees, would not go away even if these 
changes were actually implemented. 
Some have suggested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
be regulated as public utilities. This suggestion has several 
defects. First, utility regulation is designed to address the 
problem that public utilities benefit from scale economies that 
may give them characteristics of monopolies;91 price regulation 
by a public utility commission seeks to prevent a public utility 
from imposing monopoly pricing on its customers.92  
In other words, rather than limiting the size of a public 
utility, government accepts a utility’s dominant market position 
and seeks to limit the high prices that could result. But taxpayers 
are at risk if the GSEs grow to hold a dominant position in the 
mortgage market.93 The need to control monopoly pricing is not 
                                                          
Taking Utility Role, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 2009. The public utility model is 
described in R. S. Seiler, Jr., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as Investor-
Owned Utilities, 11 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 117 (1999). 
90 At the time of this writing, such proposals are circulating informally 
among federal agencies and stakeholder groups.  
91 Seiler, supra note 89, at 121, 124 (“[T]he utility industries have 
generally exhibited economies of scale . . . . The superior technology and 
monopoly franchise of a traditional utility gives the firm considerable market 
power.”).  
92 Id. at 124 (“[W]hen only one firm is allowed to serve a market, the 
company has an incentive to set prices above marginal cost, restrict output, 
and engage in price discrimination, in order to earn monopoly profits. To 
limit these incentives, governments traditionally imposed limits on the rates 
of return that utilities could earn and required that their rate structures be fair 
and equitable.”). 
93 Stanton, supra note 27, at 840 (“As the GSEs have grown Treasury 
Secretary John Snow, Comptroller General David M. Walker, Congressional 
Budget Office Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and Federal Reserve Chairmen 
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as much a concern for today’s taxpayers as is the need to limit 
the size of GSEs and their accompanying financial risks. The 
public utility model, with its focus on price regulation, is not 
relevant to that problem. Indeed, a regulator with authority to 
supervise pricing could potentially decide to permit a GSE to 
charge high prices as a way to build a strong capital cushion.94  
Secondly, regulated companies too often capture their 
regulators.95 As political scientist Marver Bernstein noted, 
regulatory commissions are frequently dominated by the interests 
that they are supposed to regulate.96 Thus, under any new 
regulatory scheme, the GSEs would simply shift the application 
of their political power from domination of their past regulators 
to the new public utility regulator.  
Third, the creation of a separate utility-type regulator for the 
GSEs would not combine GSE  supervision with the 
responsibilities of a regulator that supervises banks and thrifts as 
                                                          
Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke have warned about the possibility of 
financial failure at a GSE spreading to the many holders of GSE obligations 
such as commercial banks and foreign central banks. This is what is known 
as systemic risk, which is the possibility that a failure at one institution 
causes market turmoil that spreads to other institutions in the financial 
system, with potentially serious effects for the performance of the U.S. 
economy.”).  
94 This is similar to the position of Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by 
the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007 5 (Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Conference Paper, 2009), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
news/CONFEREN/09fmc/gorton.pdf (creating a stable banking structure 
“will require that a valuable charter be recreated for firms that are deemed 
‘banks’”). 
95 See, e.g., Willem H. Buiter, Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial 
Crisis 36–38 (May 28, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed. 
org/research/conference/2008/rmm/buiter.pdf (paper prepared for 
presentation at the conference “The Role of Money Markets” jointly 
organized by Columbia Business School and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York on May 29–30, 2008). 
96 MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 92 (1955) (“During old age the working agreement that a 
commission reaches with the regulated interests becomes so fixed that the 
regulatory agency has no creative force left to mobilize against the regulated 
groups.”). 
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well as GSEs. Rather, it would encourage the preferential capital 
and supervisory requirements that lie at the core of GSE 
financial vulnerability.97 
In short, application of a public utility model to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac would perpetuate many of the vulnerabilities 
and large-scale risks of the GSE model that lie at the root of 
their failure in 2008. 
Another idea being discussed informally, though not yet 
published in a formal treatment, is to change the governance 
structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that they would be 
owned and controlled by companies that do business with 
them—a cooperative structure. The cooperative governance 
structure also fails to add quality to the GSE model. This was 
seen among the GSEs in the financial failure of the Farm Credit 
System in the mid-1980s and the troubled financial condition of 
the Federal Home Loan Banks today.98 While the investor-owned 
GSE seeks to increase risk to serve its investor owners, the 
cooperative GSE has an incentive to serve the cooperative 
owners who use its services.99 That incentive led the Farm 
                                                          
97 See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs): Why is Effective Government Supervision Hard to Achieve?, 
Address to the 37th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May 10, 2001) (“ . . . (1) the government 
subsidy allows GSEs to expand and increase their risk-taking without facing 
the market discipline that constrains other companies; (2) the GSEs have both 
incentive and ability to influence or dominate the political process; and (3) 
the unusual legal structure of GSEs involves complexities that policymakers 
may not fully understand. This paper contends that all of these factors make 
government supervision difficult, if not impossible.”). 
98 Steven Sloan, Insurance Fund for FHLBs is on the Table: Idea Could 
Help Instill Confidence, Provide Backstop, AM. BANKER, June 3, 2009, at 1 
(“As the Federal Home Loan banks continue to struggle with charges on their 
mortgage holdings, the Federal Housing Finance Agency is considering the 
creation of an insurance fund that could absorb losses at a troubled Home 
Loan bank.”). 
99 See, e.g., Stanton, Moving Toward More Capable Government, supra 
note 80, at 75 (“For the cooperative, governance by a board of directors 
means attention to the needs of the owners that use the cooperative’s services. 
Thus, a cooperative such as the Farm Credit System in the past showed a 
tendency to underprice its services . . . .”). 
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Credit System to provide credit to its cooperative borrowers 
below the GSE’s own cost of funds.100 Such an approach was not 
sustainable and led to the system declaring insolvency in the 
mid-1980s. The experience of the cooperative GSEs shows that 
turning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into cooperatives would 
not reduce their incentives or capacity to dominate the GSE 
regulator and avoid prudential requirements such as bank-type 
capital standards.   
IV. WHAT TO DO WITH THE GSES NOW THAT THEY ARE IN 
GOVERNMENT HANDS 
As instruments of government policy,101 the future of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac should depend on the amount and kind of 
support that the markets actually need. More substantial 
government support is needed in the next few years, as the 
effects of the collapsing housing credit bubble make themselves 
felt in a weakened mortgage market, rather than in five years or 
so, when the housing markets have returned to greater strength 
and stability. 
A. The Government Should Place Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac into Receivership  
The government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship rather than receivership. Unlike receivership, 
the voluntary acceptance of conservatorship by Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac was not subject to litigation,102 which could have 
                                                          
100 Stanton, Lessons for Design and Accountability, supra note 27, at 
421–23.  
101 Political scientist Lester Salamon considers the GSEs to be what he 
calls “tools of government.” A GSE, although not a government agency or 
other part of the formal government, is a tool of government that helps to 
carry out public purposes. See Stanton & Moe, supra note 83. 
102 Section 1369(b)(4) (“Appointment of Conservators”) of the 1992 Act 
provides that “[a]ppointment of a conservator pursuant to consent of the 
enterprise under subsection (a)(2) shall not be subject to judicial review under 
this subsection.” Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4619(b)(2)(2008). 
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further troubled the financial markets at a difficult time.  
Placing a failed financial institution directly into 
conservatorship violates the customary practice of the federal 
bank and thrift regulators who first place an institution into 
receivership, then separate the assets into a “good-bank/bad-
bank” structure and send the good bank, cleaned out of troubled 
assets, into conservatorship or bridge-bank status.103 Placing an 
institution into receivership removes the shareholders of the 
defunct institution. Thus, when IndyMac, a large thrift 
institution with over $32 billion in assets, failed,104 it was placed 
into receivership.105 The receiver then transferred the deposits 
and most of the assets to a newly chartered thrift, IndyMac 
Federal Bank,106 with the FDIC as conservator.107  
It is now time to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
receivership. As past losses materialize and are recognized by 
the two GSEs, it is clear that both institutions have lost much 
more than their entire net worth.108 Placing both companies into 
                                                          
103 Appointment of a receiver for an insolvent bank or thrift institution 
with federally insured deposits is required under conditions specified in 12 
U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3)(C) (2008). Authority to establish a bridge bank is 
found in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)(2008). 
104 Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Establishes IndyMac 
Fed. Bank, FSB as Successor to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, Cal. (July 
11, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08056. 
html. 
105 See, e.g., Chief Financial Officer’s (CFO) Report to the Board, 
Executive Summary Third Quarter 2008, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., available 
at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/cfo_report_3rdqtr_08/exec_ 
summary.html (“During the third quarter of 2008, the FDIC was named 
receiver for . . . IndyMac Bank of Pasadena, California.”).  
106 Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Review of 
Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts Before the Fin. Servs. Comm. U.S. House of 
Representatives (Sep. 17, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/ 
news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spsep1708.html (“As the Committee 
knows, the former IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, California, was closed 
July 11. The FDIC is conservator for a new institution, IndyMac Federal 
Bank, F.S.B. (IndyMac Federal), to which the accounts and assets of the 
former IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. were transferred.”).  
107 Id.  
108 Fannie Mae Seeks $10.7B in US Aid After 2Q Loss, N.Y. TIMES, 
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receivership will help to remove an inherent conflict in the 
government’s position. Technically, conservatorship means that 
the government is working to restore the companies to financial 
health;109 the government has preserved the shareholders in the 
two companies and allowed their stock to trade freely. This is 
inconsistent with key aspects of the government’s need to use 
the two companies to support the mortgage market, now that the 
value of the holdings of private shareholders in the companies is 
zero.110 Until shareholders are removed from the equation, 
officers and directors of the two companies will be conflicted as 
to their fiduciary responsibilities. Do they price mortgage 
purchases low to support the market or do they price higher to 
replenish the companies’ shareholder value?111 The two 
companies and their managers appear to be caught in the strong 
contradiction between their obligations to serve their remaining 
shareholders and the needs of the housing market.112 
If the government placed both companies into receivership, 
                                                          
Aug. 7, 2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/fannie-mae-
seeks-107-billion-in-aid-after-loss/?scp=1&sq=fannie&st=cse (“Fannie 
Mae’s new request for $10.7 billion from the Treasury Department will bring 
the total for Fannie and Freddie to nearly $96 billion.”). 
109 “The FHFA, as Conservator, may take all actions necessary and 
appropriate to (1) put the Company in a sound and solvent condition and (2) 
carry on the Company’s business and preserve and conserve the assets and 
property of the Company.” FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, FACT 
SHEET: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CONSERVATORSHIP 2 (2008), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/35/FHFACONSERVQA.pdf. 
110 Kopecki, supra note 3. 
111 The two companies themselves complain of the conflict in their roles 
in conservatorship. See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 
(Sept. 30, 2008); Freddie Mac, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 5 (Sept. 
30, 2008). 
112 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Government-Picked Leader Resigns as Losses 
Pile Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at D01 (“The government-appointed 
chief executive of Freddie Mac announced yesterday that he is stepping 
down . . . . David M. Moffett’s resignation comes amid growing losses at 
the McLean mortgage-finance company and unresolved questions about 
whether it should follow the path of a private firm trying to make its way 
back to profitability or that of a government agency whose overriding goal is 
carrying out public policy.”). 
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then it could use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as agents of 
reform for the mortgage market.113  
B. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Should Not Again  
Become GSEs 
To best support the mortgage market, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac should not again become privately owned 
organizations that operate with federal backing. 
For many reasons, it is important to now end the GSE status 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. First, the GSEs have now 
squandered a policy tool that government had used for decades: 
the perception of an implicit rather than explicit federal 
guarantee of their debt obligations.114 That means that 
government would need to provide some form of express 
guarantee if the GSEs were to be restored; providing an express 
government guarantee to only two companies, or even a few 
companies, would raise fundamental issues of fairness. Second, 
as was seen in the savings and loan debacle115 and now with the 
GSEs,116 the government has great difficulty managing the risks 
when it insures the liabilities of a specialized financial 
institution. If policymakers want to support the mortgage 
                                                          
113 For examples of government corporations successfully helping to 
address the consequences of earlier crises, see MARK K. CASSELL & SUSAN 
M. HOFFMAN, IBM CENTER FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, MANAGING 
A $700 BILLION BAILOUT: LESSONS FROM THE HOME OWNERS’ LOAN 
CORPORATION (2009), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Cassell 
Report.pdf. 
114 Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 636 (“ . . . the 
Treasury’s infusion of capital starting on September 7, 2008, creates the 
perception of an explicit federal guarantee for the GSEs.”). 
115 See, e.g., R. DAN BRUMBAUGH, JR., THRIFTS UNDER SIEGE at 179 
(1988) (“Now, economic volatility and widespread information distribution 
are facts of life, and exogenous and endogenous economic volatility for thrifts 
and banks are rendering deposit insurance, with its implicit taxpayer burden, 
and balance-sheet regulation increasingly untenable.”).  
116 See, e.g., STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra note 39, at 8–12 
(comparing the institutional characteristics of savings and loan associations 
(S&Ls) with GSEs). 
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market, they should authorize government guarantees of 
mortgages, or at most, mortgage-backed securities.  
Third, the government should not provide special charters to 
a limited number of specialized institutions. As the GSEs have 
shown, it is virtually impossible to protect the regulator of a few 
private institutions from being dominated.117 This is especially 
true if the regulated institutions operate under a law such as 
HERA,118 which provides for different rules, especially for 
capital, but also for other aspects of safety and soundness, than 
those applicable to other institutions in the same lines of 
business.119 Fourth, proposals to craft special rules such as trying 
to regulate the GSEs as public utilities or by limiting them to 
cooperative ownership will not overcome the vulnerabilities of 
the GSE as an institutional form that is based on political 
dominance. Consider each of these issues in turn.  
1. The End of the Implicit Government  
Guarantee of GSE Obligations 
In earlier years, government was careful to preserve the 
option that it would decline to bail out holders of GSE 
obligations and GSE-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.120 
                                                          
117 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO 
RISKS, GAO/GGD-91-90, May 1991, at 45 (“We also believe a regulator that 
oversees a single regulated entity may have difficulty remaining at arm’s 
length from that entity.”).  
118 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
(2008). 
119 For example, a federal financial regulator needs discretion to set and 
adjust capital standards according to events as they occur. Compare the 
rulemaking requirements of HERA, section 1111(d)(3), with the much more 
flexible authority of the federal bank regulators at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3907(a)(2)(2008) (“Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall have the 
authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a banking institution 
as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be 
necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the 
banking institution.”). 
120 Thus, the Fannie Mae Charter Act contains a requirement that:  
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Government officials regularly used careful language indicating 
that the government’s involvement merely created the perception 
of an implicit guarantee rather than an actual guarantee.121 These 
niceties began to erode with the financial rescue of the failed 
Farm Credit System in the mid-1980s and the government’s rush 
to support obligations of the Financing Corporation (FICO) in 
1996.122 With the government support of holders of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac debt obligations and mortgage-backed-
securities as part of the government’s rescue of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac on September 7, 2008, the perception of implicit 
government backing of GSEs has become an anachronism.123 
One consequence of the destruction of the implicit guarantee is 
that in the future, government will be required to provide either 
an express guarantee, backed by the full-faith and credit of the 
United States, or none at all. Another consequence is that, 
unlike the former implicit federal guarantee, explicit government 
guarantees are included in the federal budget. Thus, the Office 
                                                          
The corporation shall insert appropriate language in all of its 
obligations issued under this subsection clearly indicating that such 
obligations, together with the interest thereon, are not guaranteed by 
the United States and do not constitute a debt or obligation of the 
United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof other than the 
corporation.  
12 U.S.C. § 1719(b) (2008). The corresponding Freddie Mac Charter 
provision is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1455(h)(2) (2008).  
121 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING ENTERPRISES: 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SEVERING GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP, GGD-96-120, 
May 1996, at 25 (“The most important benefit that the enterprises receive 
from their government-sponsored status, however, is an implicit one 
stemming from investors’ perception that the federal government would not 
allow the enterprises to default on their obligations.”). 
122 On the former, see, STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra note 39, at 
124. On the latter see, e.g., Associated Press, House Panel Backs Rescue of 
S & L. Fund, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/ 
07/26/business/house-panel-backs-rescue-of-s-l-fund.html?scp=55&sq=%22 
financing+corporation%22&st=nyt&pagewanted=print. The Financing 
Corporation is authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (2008).  
123 Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 636 (“ . . . the 
Treasury’s infusion of capital starting on September 7, 2008, creates the 
perception of an explicit federal guarantee for the GSEs.”).  
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of Management and Budget (OMB) (which administers 
budgeting for credit programs for the Executive Branch),124 is 
likely to score borrowing by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (or 
their successor organizations performing similar functions) as a 
part of credit reform, comparable to the budget treatment of 
financial guarantees issued by Ginnie Mae (a wholly owned 
government corporation located in the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development that guarantees mortgage-backed 
securities insured or guaranteed by FHA or other government 
agencies).125 The days of the GSE as a source of an off-budget 
government subsidy for housing finance are coming to an end.  
2. The Risks of Insuring Liabilities of  
Specialized Financial Institutions 
As periodic failures of federal guarantee programs have 
shown,126 the government can, and sometimes does, lose the 
capacity to supervise use of its financial guarantee. Losses occur 
when a federal program incurs defaults on loans that an agency 
guarantees, or on direct loans that an agency provides.127 For 
                                                          
124 OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
CIRCULAR NO. A-129, POLICIES FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS AND NON-
TAX RECEIVABLES (2000). 
125 Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association, was 
chartered in 1968 as a wholly owned government corporation at the time that 
Fannie Mae was chartered as a GSE. Both organizations are successors to the 
original Federal National Mortgage Association that until 1968 was a wholly 
owned government corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (2008). 
126 See generally, LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., MORTGAGE ON AMERICA 143 
(Praeger Publishers 1974) (discussing the failure of HUD single-family and 
multifamily programs in the early 1970s).  
127 Credit budgeting requires a calculation of the so-called credit 
subsidy, i.e., the budgetary outlays that will be required to fund new 
loans or loan guarantees that the government provides each fiscal 
year. Credit reform recognizes that a loan’s true cost is . . . the net 
value of its cash flows over the life of the loan. This value is the 
loan’s “subsidy cost”, [sic] which is the net present value of a loan’s 
expected cash inflows and outflows over the life of the loan. For 
example, if the estimated present value of a direct loan’s cash 
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example, the FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance program128 
currently would seem to be especially at risk of incurring high 
rates of defaults on mortgages that the FHA insures.129  
However, a guarantee of assets rather than liabilities has 
several advantages for the government and taxpayers. First, 
asset guarantees are subject to oversight through the federal 
budget and the application of credit budgeting.130 This allows the 
Office of Management and Budget to monitor the risks involved 
in extending the guarantee and to provide regular feedback to 
the agency and program through the annual process of re-
estimating the budgetary costs.131  
Such supervision and discipline is lacking for federal 
                                                          
outflows equals $100 and the present value of its inflows equals $90, 
its subsidy cost is $10 and its subsidy rate is 10 percent. If an 
agency proposed to make $2,000 of these loans, it would seek an 
appropriation of 10 percent of the desired face value, or $200. 
Budgeting for loan programs with this present value-based 
accounting system represented a significant departure for the 
otherwise cash-based Federal budget.  
THOMAS H. STANTON, Loans and Loan Guarantees, in TOOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 384. 
128 The FHA program is explained on the HUD website. HUD, Federal 
Housing Administration, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2009) (“The Federal Housing Administration, generally 
known as ‘FHA’, [sic] provides mortgage insurance on loans made by FHA-
approved lenders throughout the United States and its territories. FHA 
insures mortgages on single family and multifamily homes including 
manufactured homes and hospitals. It is the largest insurer of mortgages in 
the world, insuring over 34 million properties since its inception in 1934.”).  
129 See, e.g., Preston, supra note 85; Barry Meier, As FHA’s Role 
Grows, So Does the Risk of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008. 
130 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
131 The Office of Management and Budget annually estimates the risk of 
each federal credit program and the amount of subsidy that would need to be 
provided to offset the risk of loans and loan guarantees originated during the 
year. For data on credit programs for the most recent Fiscal Year, see 
Federal Credit Supplement: Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 
2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/ 
cr_supp.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).  
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programs that guarantee liabilities rather than financial assets.132 
Thus, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) has 
been able to guarantee hundreds of billions of dollars of debt in 
response to the financial crisis, including obligations of troubled 
institutions such as Citigroup and Bank of America, without 
being accountable through the federal budget.133 Similarly, 
guarantees of corporate pension plan liabilities by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) are not subject to 
budget constraints.134  
Second, it is less difficult to monitor the risks inherent in a 
guarantee of assets than in a guarantee of liabilities. For a 
guarantee of assets, the government must monitor the quality of 
origination, servicing, and collections, and the credit quality of 
the assets themselves.135 By contrast, monitoring a guarantee of 
liabilities of a financial institution involves trying to assess the 
quality of the institution’s management, its capitalization, its 
accounting practices, and many other potential sources of risk 
besides the quality of its assets. 
Third, as was seen most clearly in the savings and loan 
                                                          
132 F. Stevens Redburn, How Should the Government Measure Spending? 
The Uses of Accrual Accounting, 53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 228 (1993). 
133 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2009 69 (2008). The “Credit and Insurance” chapter is 
instructive when one compares budget treatment of credit programs, including 
direct loans and federal guarantees of financial assets, with guarantees of 
liabilities such as the FDIC guarantee of obligations of insolvent financial 
institutions.  
134 Estimated losses on guarantees by the PBGC were estimated at $47 
billion. Again, the Analytical Perspectives “Credit and Insurance” chapter is 
instructive when one compares budget treatment of credit programs, including 
direct loans and federal guarantees of financial assets, with guarantees of 
liabilities by the PBGC. See id. The law states that liabilities of the PBGC 
are not backed by the United States. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) (2008) (“The 
United States is not liable for any obligation or liability incurred by the 
corporation.”). As with the backing of GSE obligations that the GSEs 
disavow in their loan documentation, no one believes this. See supra note 
120. 
135 Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6. 
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debacle, a federal guarantee of an institution’s liabilities creates 
adverse incentives. When the government guarantees obligations 
of a financial firm through deposit insurance, for example, 
insured depositors lose incentive to monitor the safety and 
soundness of the institution to which they are lending money 
when they make a deposit. Unless the government supervises 
them closely, owners of such a financial institution, can in turn, 
take much greater risks than if investors were more vigilant in 
their obligations. This can greatly compound the government’s 
risk exposure, compared to the actual volume of liabilities that 
government believes it is guaranteeing.136 By contrast, when 
government guarantees financial assets or even pools of financial 
assets, it can provide for risk sharing that, at least in principle, 
can reduce the government’s potential losses.  
For all of these reasons, if government can avoid 
guaranteeing the liabilities of a private institution, it should do 
so. In the case of providing support for the residential mortgage 
market, this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that federal 
mortgage insurance, or perhaps a federal guarantee of pools of 
mortgages, with appropriate risk-sharing with the loan 
originator, can provide needed support for the mortgage market 
without incurring the risks involved in trying to guarantee the 
liabilities of a GSE.137 It also seems prudent that the future 
structure of housing finance must take account of the difficulty 
that both public and private sector managers can have in trying 
to manage a large volume of assets and mortgage-backed 
securities. 
                                                          
136 For example, that was the case with the savings and loan debacle. 
See, e.g., BRUMBAUGH, supra note 115; STANTON, A STATE OF RISK, supra 
note 39, at 8–12. 
137 See, e.g., Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra  note 6, at 636 
(“The benefit of this option is that it cleanly removes shareholders and 
current management from the equation and allows the government to pump 
federally backed funds into the mortgage market on a prudent basis.”). 
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3. Special Charters and the Problem  
of Regulatory Capture  
Regulatory capture is a major problem for federal regulators 
in many parts of the economy.138 The problem is especially acute 
for a regulator of only a few institutions. Such a regulator can 
be expected to assume a parochial point of view compared to a 
regulator with responsibility for supervising a plethora of 
institutions with varying interests and perspectives.139  
The problem becomes especially acute for institutions such 
as GSEs that fall into a hybrid category between other 
organizational types.140 Take, for example, the issue of 
appropriate capital standards: should GSE capital standards be 
set according to bank-type standards or according to the 
standards that state regulators apply to private mortgage-backed 
securities conduits? Economist Willem Buiter argues that what 
he calls “cognitive regulatory capture” can bring financial 
                                                          
138 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 96, at 295 (“By insulating themselves 
from popular political forces, the commissions have subjected themselves to 
undue influence from the regulated groups and tend to become protective 
spokesmen for the industries which they regulate.”); see also Buiter, supra 
note 95, at 36–41 (showing the power of what he calls “cognitive regulatory 
capture”).  
139 The GAO has made similar observations and earlier recommended 
that all of the GSEs be supervised by a single high-level regulator:  
Because of its important responsibility to supervise the safety and 
soundness of all the enterprises, the members of the independent 
regulator’s board need to have sufficient status, respect in 
government and business, and financial expertise. GAO proposes a 
three-member board composed of a full-time chairperson who acts as 
the chief executive officer of the regulatory staff, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System.  
CHARLES BOWSHER, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING GOVERNMENT’S EXPOSURE TO RISKS GAO/GGD-
91–90, May 1991, at 8. This recommendation failed to be adopted, in part 
because it could have placed congressional jurisdiction over the regulator into 
a broad-based committee such as the House Ways and Means Committee 
rather than in the hands of the GSE authorizing committees.  
140 STANTON, supra note 5, at 1. 
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regulators into the cognitive mindset of the institutions that they 
regulate.141 Cognitive capture is not a product of corruption, but 
rather a process by which the regulator or relevant congressional 
actors internalize “as if by osmosis, the objectives, interests, and 
perception of reality of the vested interests they are meant to 
regulate and supervise . . . .”142 The dynamic of Buiter’s 
cognitive regulatory capture means that over time, a regulator 
can grow to favor the institutions that it regulates. Thus, a 
regulator with responsibility for supervising only the housing 
GSEs under a statute with a unique statement of capital 
requirements compared to other financial institutions, can gain 
motivation to move towards lower capital standards.143 This 
opens the door to regulatory arbitrage and the likelihood that the 
GSEs once again would resume their excessive growth, based on 
their regulatory advantages rather than on whether it makes 
sense to concentrate so much risk in a few specialized financial 
institutions.  
The inability of the Congress to set bank-type capital 
standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or to create for them 
a supervisory framework that was at least as strong as the 
supervisory framework for banks,144 stands as a warning of the 
political dynamics that are at play here. As specialized 
institutions,145 GSEs tend to be the province of parochial 
                                                          
141 Buiter, supra note 95, at 37. 
142 Id. 
143 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In contrast to HERA, 
which maintains a distinct statutory framework for the GSEs, there are now 
consolidated statutory requirements for the bank and thrift regulators. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, as amended, in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1813(q) (2008) defines “Appropriate Federal Banking Agency” to include 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (the thrift regulator) as well as the bank 
regulators and, in 12 U.S.C § 1818 (2008), grants common supervisory 
authority and imposes common responsibility upon each “appropriate federal 
banking agency” to apply remedies to deal with troubled institutions that are 
under their supervision.  
144 See Stanton, Public Adminstration Theory, supra note 6, at 634–35. 
145 See, e.g., STANTON, MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 8 
(“Like thrifts, government-sponsored enterprises are specialized lenders. In 
return for their statutory benefits they are limited by law to serving 
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committees or subcommittees of the Congress that are attuned to 
the benefits of GSEs for the stakeholders whom they serve, and 
are relatively insensitive to the need to protect ordinary 
taxpayers from having to pay for an expensive rescue.146  
The prospect of differential capital and other supervisory 
requirements that permit regulatory arbitrage means that GSEs 
again can evolve to become not only “too big to fail,” but also 
too big to succeed.147 The failure of internal controls at both 
GSEs was revealed at Freddie Mac in 2003 and at Fannie Mae 
in 2004,148 when they were much smaller than they were when 
they failed completely several years later. More recently, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have shown, at great cost to the 
residential mortgage market and larger financial system, that the 
GSEs and their politically oriented managers lack the ability to 
manage such large institutions.  
One should not ignore the fact that many other kinds of 
financial institutions, including banks, thrifts, and investment 
banks and their holding companies also failed in the recent 
debacle. The point here is that the GSE can be replaced by a 
wholly owned government corporation to provide comparable 
                                                          
prescribed kinds of borrowers or dealing in specified kinds of loans.”).  
146 Thus, when considering whether to create the first safety-and-
soundness regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which became 
OFHEO in 1992), members of the House Banking Committee joked about 
whether the legislation was necessary. Asked one Representative, “I’m just 
not sure exactly what we’re doing . . . . I still want to know what basic 
problem we’re attempting to fix.” Answered another, “Palpitations in the 
Treasury Department, cause unknown.” Jill Zuckman, Bills To Increase GSE 
Oversight Move Ahead in House, Senate, CONG. Q., Aug. 3, 1991, at 21–39. 
147 See, e.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: 
THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 26 (Brookings Institution Press 2004) 
(defining institutions that are too big to fail as so large, complex, or 
intertwined with the rest of the financial system that policymakers support the 
institution’s uninsured creditors—despite having no legal obligation to do so—
for fear that the institution’s failure could cause an unacceptable amount of 
damage to other institutions and the larger financial system. Economic costs 
accrue “when weak market discipline associated with too big to fail induces 
banks to make suboptimal decisions.”). 
148 Stanton, supra note 27, at 840–42. 
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support to the mortgage market without incurring the political 
and financial risks inherent in the GSE’s hybrid organizational 
form. 
C. The Government Should Turn Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac into Wholly Owned Government Corporations 
The government should promptly end Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac as investor-owned companies with perceived 
federal backing and turn them into wholly owned government 
corporations.149 At some specified time—say five years from 
now, when the mortgage market stabilizes once again—
policymakers can decide the extent to which government support 
for the secondary mortgage market would be useful or 
affordable.  
The wholly owned government corporation is a special type 
of government agency that is intended to operate in a 
businesslike way.150 Government corporations are supposed to be 
financially self-sustaining, or at least potentially self-sustaining. 
They keep their books similar to a private firm and submit 
business-type budgets rather than government budgets each year. 
The idea of a government corporation is that it should seek to 
fund itself from its operations. If Congress decides to add 
noneconomic programs to a government corporation charter, 
then it should appropriate money to enable the government 
corporation to carry out these activities. 
In the current environment, when many people express 
concerns about the large size of government, it is helpful to 
remember that GSEs combine the involvement of government 
with the incentives of private owners to create a much larger, 
and economically more distorting, presence in the mortgage 
                                                          
149 Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 9101 (2008) 
(defining the contours of the term “wholly owned government corporation”). 
150 See, e.g., Stanton & Moe, supra note 83, at 81; Office of 
Management and Budget, Memorandum on Government Corporations, M-96-
05, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1995); U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
Government Corporations: Profiles of Existing Government Corporations, 
GGD-96-14, at 5 (1995). 
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market than occurs if a government corporation were quietly 
serving its mission without the drive to constant expansion that 
systematically occurs with any GSE.151 
Transformed into government corporations, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac could carry out significant activities during the next 
five years. They could:  
1. Lower the cost of mortgages to help consumers 
refinance out of adjustable rate and other kinds of 
mortgages that are proving difficult for many 
homeowners to repay.  
2. Serve as vehicles to deliver improved federal support 
for homeowners who are forced into foreclosure by 
losing their jobs. 
3. Provide essential consumer protections for borrowers, 
such as Alex Pollock’s one-page mortgage disclosure 
form.152  
4. Devise and impose requirements that primary lenders 
and other participants in the mortgage process have 
appropriate financial strength and capability, 
accountability, and that they engage in appropriate risk-
sharing before they are allowed to do business with the 
two companies. Implementation of some of these 
requirements may need to be deferred until the housing 
and mortgage markets regain some semblance of 
stability. 
5. Adapt their Automated Underwriting Systems, and 
perhaps other systems and capabilities, for use by other 
federal agencies, starting with the FHA, and perhaps 
Ginnie Mae and the direct loan program for homeowners 
(part of the disaster loan program) of the Small Business 
                                                          
151 See, e.g., Stanton & Moe, supra note 83, at 82; see also STANTON, 
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES, supra note 5, at 4–6, (showing statistics of how 
all of the GSEs, whether investor-owned or cooperatives, virtually doubled in 
size every five years). 
152 ALEX POLLOCK, THE BASIC FACTS ABOUT YOUR MORTGAGE LOAN 
(American Enterprise Institute 2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
20070913_20070515_PollockPrototype.pdf. 
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Administration.153  
In short, the government could turn the collapse of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into an opportunity to fashion important 
rules of conduct for those types of participants in the housing 
market that have served American consumers and taxpayers so 
poorly. The government also could use the GSEs to help shore 
up the FHA by providing technical and IT systems support. 
Once they become wholly owned government corporations 
without the need to serve a mix of public and private objectives, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could play major roles in 
supporting the housing market. 
Congress would be well advised to place a sunset provision 
of perhaps five years into each government corporation charter. 
A sunset date, which formally would terminate the corporation 
charter and require an end to its operations, provides an 
opportunity for policymakers to determine whether the enabling 
legislation should be reauthorized and, if so, in what form. As 
the sunset approaches, and the mortgage debacle is hopefully 
behind us, policymakers can decide whether further support for 
the mortgage market is required, and which organizational form 
is most suitable. 
If they decided to wind up two government corporations at 
the end of five years, policymakers would address both the 
capacity and the life-cycle disadvantages that can otherwise 
accompany the creation of wholly owned government 
corporations. Having a five year sunset period would allow the 
wholly owned government corporations to provide support for 
the mortgage market at a critical time.154 The experience of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) indicates how a 
temporary government corporation can develop the capacity to 
                                                          
153 Thomas H. Stanton, Strengthening Government’s Ability to Deal With 
the Financial Crisis IBM CENTER FOR THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT (2009) 
[hereinafter Stanton, Strengthening Government’s Ability], at 13, available at 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/StantonFinancial.pdf. (discussing 
FHA’s need for enhanced capacity). 
154 As GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2009 fund almost three 
quarters of new residential mortgage originations. See, e.g., Lockhart, supra 
note 19, at 10. 
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deal with complex financial issues. It does this by attracting 
high-quality talent that might not contemplate a longer term 
career in government.155 The RTC was impressive in the way 
that it evolved constant improvements in its approach to its 
mission.156  
Even though the Congress could allow one or both of the 
government corporations to sunset at the end of their charter 
terms, this is not a foregone conclusion. The continuation of a 
government corporation could appeal to some policymakers, for 
example because of the ability to use revenues from mortgage 
operations to support affordable housing.157  
In 1996, the General Accounting Office undertook a study to 
examine the consequences for the housing market if Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac ceased to operate as firms with any 
government backing at all. The GAO concluded that the effects 
would be limited: 
Privatization would likely change the behavior of market 
participants and increase average interest rates on fixed-
rate, single-family mortgages within an average range of 
about 15 to 35 basis points. However, privatization 
would not mean the end of the secondary mortgage 
market, a return to regional disparities in mortgage 
interest rates that were not based on differences in risk, 
or a lack of mortgage credit in the economy during parts 
of the business cycle. It would probably mean that 
mortgage rates would increase in areas with higher risks, 
for houses with higher loan-to-value ratios, and in 
                                                          
155 Accord Stanton, supra note 6, at 636 (“Life cycle is also an issue. 
After some years the government corporations could ‘ossify,’ i.e., begin to 
display some of the kinds of bureaucratic infirmities that FHA (for example) 
has manifested in recent years.”). 
156 See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Lessons Learned: Obtaining Value 
From Federal Asset Sales, 23 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22 (2003).  
157 Section 1131 of HERA, Pub. L. 110–289, established a Housing 
Trust Fund that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would fund with contributions.  
It would be possible to build such an affordable housing program into a 
government corporation that serves the mortgage market. See supra note 6, at 
636. 
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periods of high mortgage demand.158 
Just as one must question whether a GSE or other private 
institution is properly manageable once it funds, say, a trillion 
dollars of mortgages,159 one must also question whether 
managers of wholly owned government corporations will be up 
to the task. As a matter of protecting taxpayers from excessive 
financial risk it would be prudent to limit the size of both public 
and private institutions that provide financial support to the 
mortgage market. One clear lesson of the current debacle is that 
it is risky to maintain immense financial institutions of any kind 
over the long term.160  
One possible way would be to use a government corporation 
to provide government support for limited purposes, such as a 
30-year fixed-rate mortgage for selected borrowers such as first-
time homebuyers. Alternatively, concern about size and risk 
could lead policymakers to sunset the government corporations 
after the mortgage market is back on its feet. In either event, the 
model of the wholly owned government corporation would 
                                                          
158 U.S. General Accounting Office, Housing Enterprises: Potential 
Impacts of Severing Government Sponsorship, GGD-96-120, May 1996, at 
70. A “basis point” is one-one-hundredth of a percentage point. 
159 Economist Joseph Stiglitz makes this point about banks: 
[T]he problem of too-big-to-fail institutions remains. There are but 
two solutions: breaking up the institutions or regulating them 
heavily. For reasons that I will make clear, we need to do both.  
The only justification for allowing these huge institutions to continue 
is that there are significant economies of scope or scale that 
otherwise would be lost. I have seen no evidence to that effect . . . 
we have little to lose, and much to gain, by breaking up these 
behemoths, which are not just too big to fail but also too big to save 
and too big to manage. 
Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? Examining the Systematic Threats of 
Large Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 
111th Cong. 25–26 (2009) (statement of Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Prize 
Recipient & Professor, Columbia University), available at http://jec.senate. 
gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.HearingsCalendar (follow “April 
21st—Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save?” hyperlink; then follow “Joseph 
Stiglitz” hyperlink). 
160 See id. 
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remain available when needed to provide government support 
for the mortgage market in the event of any future crisis. 
CONCLUSION: USE THE FORMER GSES EXTENSIVELY AT FIRST 
AND THEN FOR MORE LIMITED SUPPORT OF THE MORTGAGE 
MARKET 
The government-sponsored enterprise has outlived its 
usefulness as an instrument of government policy. While other 
financial institutions have also shown vulnerability, the GSE 
appears to be especially prone to dominating and ultimately 
evading any reasonable accountability structure. GSEs are 
simply too powerful for their own good. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, now demonstrably insolvent, should be placed into 
receivership and turned into wholly owned government 
corporations that could sunset after perhaps five years. As such 
they could support the mortgage market, not only through their 
access to government funding, but also by imposing rules for 
consumer and investor protection, capital requirements on 
mortgage market participants, and other protective measures that 
policymakers could apply to the rest of the housing finance 
system. Also, they could help to shore up potentially vulnerable 
government agencies such as the FHA that are playing 
increasingly important roles in the mortgage market. After that, 
when circumstances have improved, policymakers can decide 
whether the needs of the housing market should be served by a 
government corporation, and how to shape that government 
corporation to address those needs. Especially for the next few 
years, but also potentially for the longer term, the wholly owned 
government corporation is an organizational form that offers 
great promise as a source of support for the mortgage market. 
